geopo litical monitor
The ‘Jamahiriya’, the odd republic that former Libyan leader Mu’ammar
al-Qadhafi created in accordance to a ‘model’ he conceived and expressed
in his seminal “Green Book” - based on his Third Universal Theory,
functioning as a kind of Constitution for Libya - was at best described
as a confused mishmash of Chinese socialism with Islamic coloring. It
was by all means a mess, but it worked in the sense that it kept Libya
united, thanks to the authority and fear mongering exercised by its
creator. Now, over three years after Qadhafi’s demise, Libya has plunged
back into chaos. Not a week goes by without news that an ambassador,
(the latest being the Jordanian one), or a foreign security official
(the latest being one guarding the US embassy) has been kidnapped.
Last
March, in the wake of a no-confidence vote, Prime Minister Ali Zeidan
resigned for "the good of the nation" and to ensure that Libyans “no
longer fight each other.” The resignation came in the wake of an
embarrassing security breach involving a North Korean oil tanker, loaded
with oil, which was stolen by a rebel militia. Libya's oil production
fell to 250,000 barrels per day (bpd) - a significant decline
considering that during the Qadhafi regime, production was nearly 1.5
million bpd and destined for even higher volumes. Libyan MP’s have
denounced the oil crisis that erupted last summer, when a group of armed
militants led by Ibrahim Jathran took control of the four ports of the
Gulf of Sirte, from which 80% of Libyan crude is exported. Sometime
after the crisis broke out, the former prime minister left the country
on a plane to Europe.
The Libyan parliament appointed Abdullah
al-Thani, former defense minister, to form a new interim government and
lead Libya until elections next May. The appointment was fatefully made
at a hotel surrounded by protesters who were threatening an assault. In
most Arab countries, leaders do their best to hold on to power; on April
13, al-Thani resigned, forcing the Libyan parliament to resume the ever
more arduous task of finding someone willing to take on this very
unpopular role. Of course, the resignation and the lack of an effective
government suggest that May elections will have to be postponed. Indeed,
apart from leaders taking cover from their responsibilities, none of
them seem interested in addressing the root causes of the turmoil.
A
UN report argues that the proliferation of weapons (to and from Libya)
is the main cause of instability in the country. Over the past three
years, Libya has become a source of illicit weapons in 14 countries in
the region and beyond, reaching as far as Syria. This makes Libya a
potential base for Al-Qaida, or its incarnations, for any operation
targeting Italy, Great Britain, France, Spain, Morocco or anywhere else
in North Africa. Armed militias in conflict with each other are then
determined to keep their arsenals private, leaving the new Libyan ‘army’
unable to react and the government unable to extend its reach beyond
certain areas of Tripoli. Former PM Ali Zeidan often called for the
disarmament of militias but it never happened. Without the government to
restore security in Tripoli, he and his administration were helpless in
the face of tribal and regional differences and growing corruption.
Sometimes,
the fast rising influence of the Libyan Muslim Brotherhood has been
used as an excuse for a good deal of these problems. Surely, they now
control the majority of parliament, but the problems do not end there.
The country is increasingly divided into two parts: Tripolitania and
Cyrenaica, in perpetual conflict, with the southern region of Fezzan now
at the mercy of powerful clans who draft their own laws and enrich
themselves with smuggling activities (humans, weapons, and surely drugs
included) across the porous border with Niger, Chad, and Algeria.
The
solution, evidently, might be found in returning the country to the
federal arrangement that existed during the pre-Qadhafi years of the
Sanusi monarchy. However, Tripolitania, the region where the capital is
based, is not interested in considering this option, accusing Cyrenaica
of hosting dangerous Islamic extremist movements and groups linked to
Al-Qaida. For its part, Cyrenaica, not surprisingly, the region where
the revolt against Muammar Gaddafi began, demands a ‘first among equals’
type of representation within the already unpopular federal arrangement
proposal. But the secessionist pressure in Cyrenaica is building and
the influence that Islamic groups have on the population is a source of
great concern to the international community. After all, it was in
Benghazi, capital of Cyrenaica, that US Ambassador Stevens was killed in
mysterious attack that was attributed to Al-Qaida type groups.
While
the debate over federalism continues politically, the various militias
and brigades in such cities as Misrata, Zindan, and Benghazi fight the
government and each other over slices of power and autonomy. The process
to draft a new constitution has stopped while the controversial law
known as "political isolation", which excludes people linked to the
former regime (in other words people with administrative experience)
from public administration, has paralyzed the activity of several
competent public managers. Zintan and Misrata have sometimes formed
alliances to oppose the growing Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamists
from taking over the capital. But their positions shift like the sands
of the Sahara. Their interests are different. Zintan wants influence
over the west and the southwest while Misrata wants control the vast
central region of Libya, between Tripolitania and Cyrenaica, which hosts
the richest oil fields.
Then there is the problem of oil. Oil
helped Qadhafi win him considerable support in the early years of his
dictatorship. He distributed the revenues to help deliver free
education, free health care and full state employment. Libya still has
the largest oil reserves in Africa but the chaos resulting from the
‘liberation’ has also engulfed the oil industry. Overwhelmed by frequent
and long strikes in Cyrenaica, where there are the largest deposits of
oil and gas are based; oil production has suffered a steep fall last
summer from peaks of 1.5 million bpd to pre-revolt levels or less than
150,000 bpd. Production has recovered in parts but never exceeding the
50% level (750,000 bpd) seen at the start of the year.
This has
caused enormous economic damage to international energy companies still
operating in Libya, discouraging others from returning to explore or
resume exploration and development. Oil and gas still account for 95% of
its exports in value and about 70% of GDP, which raises the issue of
how Libya will pay the salaries of over one million civil servants (the
population is estimated at 5.6 million). The low revenues mean that
there are no funds to offer wage increases and generous bonuses, the
very levers upon which the government was aiming to achieve the consent
of a population increasingly disappointed by the outcome of the
revolution. It will be even more difficult to put on the payroll
thousands of militiamen to develop a new national armed forces.
The
fracture lines highlighted most frequently (Islamists against "secular"
militias against civil society, Qadhafi loyalists against all,
separatists against unionists, are not altogether adequate in helping to
understand the complexity of the current situation. Libya was always
going to be more troublesome than others, given its unique role – and
not just in the past 60-70 years, but even during the Ottoman Empire or
Roman times for that matter. The question remains: Who governs Libya?
But it cannot be properly answered because Libya was never equipped with
the classical hierarchical categories of a state, of a central
government, or a functioning bureaucracy. These had little meaning
during the Qadhafi period – which worked solely on fear and oil
distribution, the fear making it possible for the distribution machine
to work – and it is even less meaningful today as demonstrated by the
ease with which militias can take over the sources of the country’s
wealth – oil – occupying at will oil terminals and refineries. The
influence of the militias is felt closely in the General National
Council (GNC- the parliament) such that the prime minister is often
supported by powerful militias – or rather must seek their support – in
order to bring to bear his positions over the CGN.
The militias
have spread the idea that they are the most legitimate groups in Libya
because of their participation in the revolution. The power they have
gained in the past three years has made them actors on political and
economic premises for all purposes – in some ways they can be seen as
the logical replacements of the former Revolutionary Committees, which
enforced Qadhafi’s whims and which at times blocked his attempts at
reform. This struggle for power has translated into regular armed
clashes in all major cities and especially the capital, highlighting the
inability of the GNC - the only institution with official popular
legitimacy in Libya, since it was elected by universal suffrage - of
winning the consensus necessary to cope with the immense challenges of
national reconstruction.
