ourworld.unu.edu
In recent years, the critical need to build effective global-regional
partnerships for peace has been re-emphasized in the context of the
developments surrounding the responsibility to protect (R2P) principle.
While the United Nations (UN) has devoted significant attention to the
conceptual and operational development of this emerging norm, it has
repeatedly praised regional organizations for their potential to
contribute to an efficient and consistent implementation of the R2P.
In practice, however, the record of cooperation between the UN and
regional organizations has not met the expectations formulated in R2P
discourse.
In Libya in 2011, for instance, the UN and the African Union (AU)
failed to join forces to seek an acceptable solution to the crisis.
Instead, the two organizations independently adopted conflict resolution
strategies that reflected their profoundly different perceptions of the
situation and divergent stances towards the parties involved in the
conflict. The lack of coordination of their efforts was detrimental to
the conduct of their conflict settlement actions.
As the UN-mandated and NATO-led “no-fly zone” rapidly imposed itself as the dominant international response, the AU high-level
ad hoc
committee (AU committee) on Libya became sidelined. The AU expressed,
on several occasions, its indignation about the lack of proper
consideration given to African efforts to manage the Libyan crisis, in
spite of the
recognition of the AU high-level ad hoc committee in UN Security Council resolution 1973 and the international partners’ promises of support.
A relevant illustration of the impediments to the smooth conduct of
the AU mediation mission is the rejection, by the Security Council’s
sanctions committee, of its request to fly to Libya in order to engage
in negotiations with the Libyan parties. This considerably impeded the
AU committee’s early attempts at mediation.
The absence of early consultation on the situation in Libya between
the UN and the AU carries its share of responsibility for the failure to
adopt a consensual crisis settlement approach. It is quite telling that
the first meeting on Libya between the UN Security Council and the AU
high-level
ad hoc committee only took place on 15 June — four
months after the outbreak of the crisis — at the request of the AU
Assembly. In the course of the meeting, the permanent representative of
the Republic of Uganda to the UN, in his capacity as member of the AU
committee,
voiced concerns
that unambiguously reflected the AU’s discontent with the lack of
communication between the UN and the AU and, more fundamentally, the
conflicting approaches of the two organizations.
If there is no doubt that the UN and the AU framed the situation and
the kind of necessary action differently, it can be argued that a
constructive exchange of views between the two organizations would have
contributed to reconciling their respective approaches under a
comprehensive and jointly implemented conflict settlement strategy. At
the 15 June meeting, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation of
the Islamic Republic of Mauritania, in his capacity as Chair of the AU
committee,
declared
that a holistic solution was required to address the array of key
priorities. He stressed the need to treat urgent issues in the short
term, while contemplating the long-term perspective and build
sustainable and lasting solutions.
To some extent, the division of roles in Libya was such that the UN
responded to the urgent necessity to protect Libyan citizens by imposing
a set of economic, diplomatic and military sanctions, and by voting for
the establishment of a no-fly zone. The AU, on the other hand, engaged
in tackling the longer term issue of bringing about a political and
durable solution to the conflict by drawing on the support of the Libyan
stakeholders.
If the approaches of the UN and the AU are, therefore, not
conflicting as such, a tension arises from the uncoordinated
implementation of their actions.This prompts for a substantial
strengthening of ties between the UN and regional organizations based on
well-established channels of communication fostering regular exchanges
and early consultations when crises arise.
In Libya, early dialogue among key external stakeholders, including
the UN, relevant regional organizations and neighbouring countries, and
comprehensive consultations involving representatives of the Libyan
people, would conceivably have led to a joint decision as to the mandate
and the course of action to be collectively undertaken. Such a joint
and coordinated approach would have been beneficial to the peace
process, both from the short- and long-term perspectives.
When
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton made a brief self-congratulatory
trip to Tripoli, Libya, in October 2011 — with U.S. military assets
lurking offshore in case they needed to rescue her — she joked, in the
presence of then-Ambassador Gene Cretz and Assistant Secretary of State
Jeffrey Feltman, that they had not-so-long-ago been worried that the
ambassador might end up the target of a murderous Libyan assault.
"As
Gene and Assistant Secretary Feltman and I were walking through here,
they were talking about how the last time Jeff was here was when we
were very worried that Gadhafi and [Libyan intelligence chief] Senussi
were going to kill you," Clinton said in a speech to the staff at the
U.S. Embassy.
"Yeah," said Cretz.
The State Department transcript notes there was "laughter" at this.
"I
am very pleased to have this chance to thank each and every one of
you, and to return as secretary of state to a free Libya," said
Clinton. "And what an amazing experience."
Seven months before
Clinton made this trip to Tripoli, President Obama announced in Brazil
that he was ordering the U.S. military to intervene in Libya because
"the writ of the international community must be enforced."
Within
eight months of Clinton's trip, the Defense Department and CIA were
producing repeated reports warning that Libya — particularly eastern
Libya — was becoming a safe haven for terrorists, including
al-Qaida-affiliated terrorists.
Thanks to a report released last
week by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence we now know some
of the substance of these DOD and CIA warnings.
They demonstrate
how Obama's intervention in Libya's civil war backfired and how the
inexplicable negligence of Hillary Clinton's State Department put
Americans unnecessarily at risk in Benghazi.
On June 12, 2012,
according to the intelligence committee's report, the Defense
Intelligence Agency authored a report entitled: "Libya: Terrorists Now
Targeting U.S. and Western Interests."
As characterized by the
committee — chaired by Democratic Sen. Dianne Feinstein of California —
this DIA report noted "growing ties between al-Qaida regional nodes
and Libya-based terrorists."
The DIA said: "We expect more
anti-U.S. terrorist attacks in eastern Libya [redacted], due to the
terrorists greater presence there."
Six days later, according to
the committee report, the Pentagon's Joint Staff daily intelligence
report included a slide entitled: "Terrorism: Conditions Ripe for More
Attacks, Terrorist Safe Haven in Libya."
It said: "[Redacted] support will increase Libyan terrorist capability in the permissive post-revolution security environment.
Attacks
will also increase in number and lethality as terrorists connect with
AQ associates in Libya. Areas of eastern Libya will likely become a
safe haven by the end of 2012."
A CIA report issued on July 6, 2012 — "Libya: Al-Qaida Establishing Sanctuary" — was more declarative.
"Al-Qaida-affiliated
groups and associates are exploiting the permissive security
environment in Libya to enhance their capabilities and expand their
operational reach," said this CIA report.
"This year," said the
CIA report, "Muhammad Jamal's Egypt-based network, al-Qaida in the
Arabian Peninsula, and al-Qaida in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb have
conducted training, built communications networks, and facilitated
extremist travel across North Africa from their safe haven in parts of
eastern Libya."
Two months before the Sept. 11, 2012 terrorist
attacks in Benghazi that killed four Americans, the CIA was already
reporting that al-Qaida affiliated terrorists had made parts of eastern
Libya "their safe haven."
Soon after that, a CIA officer told
State Department officials that al-Qaida affiliated terrorists had
training camps "within Benghazi."
On Aug. 15, 2012, according to
the Senate committee report, the State Department's principal officer
in Benghazi called together an "Emergency Action Committee" to discuss
"the deteriorating security situation in Benghazi."
The next
day, Ambassador Chris Stevens sent a cable to State Department
headquarters in Washington, D.C., summarizing the points made at this
meeting.
Stevens' cable said a CIA officer had "briefed the EAC
on the location of approximately ten Islamist militias and AQ training
camps within Benghazi."
When Gen. Carter Ham, then commander of
AFRICOM, saw this assessment of the situation in Libya, said the Senate
report, he offered to extend the deployment of DOD's Site Security
Team — a group "16 special operations personnel detailed to the Chief
of Mission in Libya."
"After reading the August 16, 2012, EAC
cable, General Ham called Ambassador Stevens and asked if the Embassy
needed the SST from the U.S. military, but Stevens told Ham it did
not," said the Senate report. "Shortly thereafter, Stevens traveled to
Germany for a previously scheduled meeting with Ham at AFRICOM
headquarters. Ham again offered to sustain the SST at the meeting, and
Stevens again declined."
"State Department headquarters made the
decision not to request an extension of the SST's mission in August
2012, approximately one month prior to the attacks, because State
believed that many of the duties of the SST could be accomplished by
local security forces, DS agents, or other State Department
capabilities," said the report.
After the Sept. 11, 2001
terrorist attacks, Congress authorized the president to use military
force to deny al-Qaida a sanctuary in Afghanistan. In March 2011,
President Obama unilaterally ordered the U.S. military to intervene in
Libya's civil war — and helped turn that country into a sanctuary for
al-Qaida-affiliated terrorists. - See more at:
http://cnsnews.com/commentary/terence-p-jeffrey/senate-report-cia-libya-al-qaida-establishing-sanctuary#sthash.h7TZp4ac.d
When
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton made a brief self-congratulatory
trip to Tripoli, Libya, in October 2011 — with U.S. military assets
lurking offshore in case they needed to rescue her — she joked, in the
presence of then-Ambassador Gene Cretz and Assistant Secretary of State
Jeffrey Feltman, that they had not-so-long-ago been worried that the
ambassador might end up the target of a murderous Libyan assault.
"As
Gene and Assistant Secretary Feltman and I were walking through here,
they were talking about how the last time Jeff was here was when we
were very worried that Gadhafi and [Libyan intelligence chief] Senussi
were going to kill you," Clinton said in a speech to the staff at the
U.S. Embassy.
"Yeah," said Cretz.
The State Department transcript notes there was "laughter" at this.
"I
am very pleased to have this chance to thank each and every one of
you, and to return as secretary of state to a free Libya," said
Clinton. "And what an amazing experience."
Seven months before
Clinton made this trip to Tripoli, President Obama announced in Brazil
that he was ordering the U.S. military to intervene in Libya because
"the writ of the international community must be enforced."
Within
eight months of Clinton's trip, the Defense Department and CIA were
producing repeated reports warning that Libya — particularly eastern
Libya — was becoming a safe haven for terrorists, including
al-Qaida-affiliated terrorists.
Thanks to a report released last
week by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence we now know some
of the substance of these DOD and CIA warnings.
They demonstrate
how Obama's intervention in Libya's civil war backfired and how the
inexplicable negligence of Hillary Clinton's State Department put
Americans unnecessarily at risk in Benghazi.
On June 12, 2012,
according to the intelligence committee's report, the Defense
Intelligence Agency authored a report entitled: "Libya: Terrorists Now
Targeting U.S. and Western Interests."
As characterized by the
committee — chaired by Democratic Sen. Dianne Feinstein of California —
this DIA report noted "growing ties between al-Qaida regional nodes
and Libya-based terrorists."
The DIA said: "We expect more
anti-U.S. terrorist attacks in eastern Libya [redacted], due to the
terrorists greater presence there."
Six days later, according to
the committee report, the Pentagon's Joint Staff daily intelligence
report included a slide entitled: "Terrorism: Conditions Ripe for More
Attacks, Terrorist Safe Haven in Libya."
It said: "[Redacted] support will increase Libyan terrorist capability in the permissive post-revolution security environment.
Attacks
will also increase in number and lethality as terrorists connect with
AQ associates in Libya. Areas of eastern Libya will likely become a
safe haven by the end of 2012."
A CIA report issued on July 6, 2012 — "Libya: Al-Qaida Establishing Sanctuary" — was more declarative.
"Al-Qaida-affiliated
groups and associates are exploiting the permissive security
environment in Libya to enhance their capabilities and expand their
operational reach," said this CIA report.
"This year," said the
CIA report, "Muhammad Jamal's Egypt-based network, al-Qaida in the
Arabian Peninsula, and al-Qaida in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb have
conducted training, built communications networks, and facilitated
extremist travel across North Africa from their safe haven in parts of
eastern Libya."
Two months before the Sept. 11, 2012 terrorist
attacks in Benghazi that killed four Americans, the CIA was already
reporting that al-Qaida affiliated terrorists had made parts of eastern
Libya "their safe haven."
Soon after that, a CIA officer told
State Department officials that al-Qaida affiliated terrorists had
training camps "within Benghazi."
On Aug. 15, 2012, according to
the Senate committee report, the State Department's principal officer
in Benghazi called together an "Emergency Action Committee" to discuss
"the deteriorating security situation in Benghazi."
The next
day, Ambassador Chris Stevens sent a cable to State Department
headquarters in Washington, D.C., summarizing the points made at this
meeting.
Stevens' cable said a CIA officer had "briefed the EAC
on the location of approximately ten Islamist militias and AQ training
camps within Benghazi."
When Gen. Carter Ham, then commander of
AFRICOM, saw this assessment of the situation in Libya, said the Senate
report, he offered to extend the deployment of DOD's Site Security
Team — a group "16 special operations personnel detailed to the Chief
of Mission in Libya."
"After reading the August 16, 2012, EAC
cable, General Ham called Ambassador Stevens and asked if the Embassy
needed the SST from the U.S. military, but Stevens told Ham it did
not," said the Senate report. "Shortly thereafter, Stevens traveled to
Germany for a previously scheduled meeting with Ham at AFRICOM
headquarters. Ham again offered to sustain the SST at the meeting, and
Stevens again declined."
"State Department headquarters made the
decision not to request an extension of the SST's mission in August
2012, approximately one month prior to the attacks, because State
believed that many of the duties of the SST could be accomplished by
local security forces, DS agents, or other State Department
capabilities," said the report.
After the Sept. 11, 2001
terrorist attacks, Congress authorized the president to use military
force to deny al-Qaida a sanctuary in Afghanistan. In March 2011,
President Obama unilaterally ordered the U.S. military to intervene in
Libya's civil war — and helped turn that country into a sanctuary for
al-Qaida-affiliated terrorists. - See more at:
http://cnsnews.com/commentary/terence-p-jeffrey/senate-report-cia-libya-al-qaida-establishing-sanctuary#sthash.h7TZp4ac.dpuf
