Libya is a country located in Northern Africa that borders the
Mediterranean Sea. Until the 1950s, it was regarded as another poor
African state, but the discovery of oil greatly increased its wealth,
turning it into one of the richest African countries and also increasing
its significance in the eyes of Western Powers. Emerging from the
colonial era, Libya struggled with independence and experienced almost
two decades of fragile stability as the United Kingdom of Libya from
1951-1969. However, the September 1st Revolution of 1969 saw Colonel
Muammar Gaddafi seize power in a bloodless coup d’état. Gaddafi’s Libya
lasted over 40 years, though recent events have seen the dictator ousted
and the ascendance of the constituent assembly-cum-parliament General
National Congress (GNC)
Benghazi was shaken last week by a
massive car bombing, an event that was followed by hundreds of people
taking to the streets to vent their frustration at a government that has
not been able to fill the security vacuum opened by the removal of
Gaddafi. For a sense of where Libyan politics are headed if the
country’s present instability continues, one must look to the historical
power centers, such as Tripolitania and Cyrenaica, as well as the
geopolitical factors of bordering states and resource distribution. Such
factors may determine if Libya eventually splits into two politically
autonomous territories; namely, Tripolitania and Cyrenaica.
A Brief History and the Geography of Libya
Libya’s
tribal system has been an enduring feature of its culture of resisting
imperial influence. Throughout Libya’s history, Libyans saw their own
people as authority figures. Tribal families and heads were regarded as
the country’s elite. Rather than believing in a nation state, the tribal
system categorized Libya into local governments, headed by tribal
leaders. Such leaders, in turn, would exercise their own patronage
system to maintain and exert influence (which was of greater importance
after the discovery of oil). The local and familial aspects of the
tribal system, by their very nature, did not include a sense of national
unity. The primacy of tribal belief thus mitigated certain effects of
imperialism. While Italy attempted to disrupt and divide the tribal
system, they were not very successful. Europeanization was resisted, and
Libyan elites who worked with Italian masters retained cultural links
with their fellow Libyans. Italian colonial rule ended in 1911, and Arab
Muslim culture reemerged rapidly in full strength. Nonetheless, Gaddafi
himself disliked tribal roots, viewing such a system as antiquated and
an obstacle to modernization. Hence, tribal boundaries were worked into
new zones that attempted to weaken tribal links and local patronage
systems in order to prioritize a more modern belief of (political)
competence through education of the elites. Government attempts to
abolish the tribal system were, however, resisted. Ultimately, Gaddafi
was forced to maintain his power through the manipulation of tribal
allegiances, all the more significant because of the small size of
Gaddafi’s own Gaddafa tribe.
Gaddafi’s patronage network was
structured around both security and the nation’s resources. Given his
own tribe’s small size, Gaddafi had to compensate and thus used members
of Libya’s largest tribe, the Warfalla, as security personnel. In
addition, the Zuwayya tribe in the oil-rich South would have had to be
placated in various ways (i.e. through being granted a privileged status
in Gaddafi’s patronage system) due to their proximity to resources.
This importance became clearer during anti-Gaddafi protests, when
Zuwayya members threatened to withhold oil supply due to Gaddafi’s
violence against protestors. In addition, Gaddafi’s treatment of
protestors also cost him support of the Warfallas, a major security
loss.
Geographically speaking, Libya has three regions of
significance to both political and agricultural stability. Tripolitania
and Cyrenaica have historically been political rivals. Both partnered
with Axis and Allied powers respectively during the Second World War. In
addition, tension increased considerably post-independence when Western
powers supported the installation of King Emir Sayid Idris, a
Cyrenaican, causing much bitterness in Tripolitania. When Gaddafi seized
power in 1969, feelings of bitterness and joy were reversed. Mutual
hostility has thus prevented a sense of national unity, further enforced
by the geographical layout of the Gulf of Sirte, which creates physical
distance between the two regions, symbolizing their mutual callousness
and feelings of being more Tripolitanian or Cyrenaican than united
Libyans. Finally, the region of Fezzan holds some importance for its
pastoral culture (and thus minor agricultural capabilities).
However,
Fezzan’s agrarianism is not enough to feed Libya’s population. As one
critic explains, most of Libya is composed of arid land, which cannot
sustain plant life or the growth of crops. The coast is the only area
with less dryness. However, waves from the Mediterranean Sea frequently
deposit salt on the coast, killing plant life and preventing the
possibility of agriculture. Consequently, Libya is forced to import
food, and it is therefore vital that the production of their resources
resume forthwith. It is likely that for long-term economic growth,
resumption of resource production will not be enough. As resources such
as oil and gas must be exported, political stability will be needed to
convince foreign companies to invest in the Libyan market.
Resources
With
the discovery of oil in 1959, Libya became one of the wealthiest
African states. Having been privy to Axis/Allied politics during the
Second World War, the discovery of oil piqued Western interest in Libya
more than ever, and Libya became another playing field for war games
between the US and USSR. The Sirte Basin provides 80% of Libya’s oil
output. With the largest proven oil reserves in Africa, oil is a major
export good and source of income, with up to 1.5 million barrels
exported on a daily basis. In addition, many critics argue that Libya
remains underexplored, meaning that there is a potential for greater oil
wealth. Further, Libyan oil often contains low sulfur traces, important
to oil companies and exporters wishing to comply with stringent sulfur
emission laws in Europe, Libya’s largest market. However, Libya’s
biggest export is also significant in the domestic energy market, with
oil dependence as high as 72%. Naturally, Libya must free up more oil
for exportation in order to maximize state profits. Hence, the country
is attempting to expand its use of gas (currently representing 28% of
total domestic energy consumption) and is also experimenting with solar
power in rural areas to reduce oil use. A balance between controlling
the price of oil and domestic profits and maintaining positive relations
with international oil companies has characterized Libya’s approach in
the past.
As recently as 2005, however, the Libyan government
changed the conditions of partnerships with international oil companies,
limiting the profits such companies will receive. Previously, oil
companies had enjoyed profit shares of up to 49%. Under the 2005
changes, this share has been reduced by up to half, and in some cases,
oil companies are only granted an extension of their license to explore
and profit from Libyan oil if they commit to further financial
investment into the Libyan oil sector. This shift in attitudes from
prioritizing positive relations with international oil companies to
reducing their profits so as to increase state shares reveals how Libya
now considers itself a well-established oil state (thus granting it
greater control over its share of oil profits). Furthermore, the demands
of reinvestment made on foreign oil companies illustrates how Libya
both recognizes the importance of exportation as an almost sole source
of profit and the potential for increased oil wealth through further
exploration. Indeed, the latter likely explains why the state’s National
Oil Company expects oil exploration to be undertaken by all oil
companies operating in Libya.
Libya’s secondary natural resource
is gas, which is becoming a significant good for both exportation and
domestic energy consumption. As of 2011, Libya’s proven gas reserves
were estimated at 54.7 trillion cubic feet. Though the second-lowest
figure when compared to the rest of Africa, it is estimated that further
exploration will see it rise considerably. Given Libya’s wish to
decrease oil dependence, it is no surprise that gas production has
steadily increased. By 2011, gas accounted for almost half of
electricity production. While this figure does show an attempt to reduce
oil dependence, gas use is still split between electricity generation
and the use of gas to enhance oil recovery. Naturally, this split
illustrates the difficult balance between reducing oil dependence
through gas consumption and increasing oil production to increase oil
exports. The difficulty of this balance, together with frequent project
delays (exacerbated by Gaddafi’s downfall and subsequent turmoil) has
limited the utility of gas and will likely continue to do so until the
Libyan state is stable enough to focus on long-term state building and
maximizing gas production through prompt project startups, both for
domestic gas consumption and for increasing oil recovery and thus oil
exportation.
The Geography of Resource Exportation
It
is no coincidence that European states are the main recipients of
Libyan oil. Historically, Libya’s proximity to Europe has allowed
European powers to attach greater importance to Libyan oil than oil from
the Arab world. Proximity translated into lower transportation costs
and, more importantly, all pipelines ran directly across Libyan
territory, a luxury geographically impossible with pipelines running
from Arab Gulf states to Europe. Further, Libyan oil may be transported
directly from Libya to Europe, with Sicily as the main entry point. The
advantage of such direct transportation was highlighted by the closure
of the Suez Canal shortly after the 1967 Middle East War. The closure
severely affected oil transport routes from the Middle East to Europe.
The importance of direct transportation has also been considered by
Libya’s gas industry, with the construction of the Greenstream pipeline.
Operational since 2004, the pipeline provides a direct gas route from
the Libyan coast to Sicily and from Sicily to Italy’s mainland.
Finally,
it is worth mentioning Sicily’s proximity to Libya. Geographically
speaking, Italy is one of the main entry points of Libyan exports. This
proximity symbolizes both Italy’s former imperial ties to Libya, but
also current Italian-Libyan relations. Italy is the largest recipient of
Libyan oil, and also has close commercial ties with Libya through Eni,
Libya’s largest foreign oil producer. Eni has operated in Libya since
1959, and in 2009, the Libyan government invested in the Italian
company, granting them greater influence in Europe. Prior to this move,
Libya already had a significant stake in Europe through Tamoil, its
overseas oil representative. Tamoil has allowed Libya to engage in
direct distribution and refining of its products throughout Europe,
including in Italy and Switzerland. Given Libya’s investment in Eni, one
might say there is now an historical reversal from Italian imperialism
to Libya having a commercial interest in its former master. In addition,
Libya’s financial stake in Europe reveals how Europe’s own perception
of Libya as Africa’s resource capital is not solitary. On the one hand,
some critics may argue that Libya’s interest in Europe is simply a way
of further bolstering its own resource exportation, and thus Europe’s
interpretation of Libya purely as a resource market. On the other hand,
Libya’s penetration into European markets and distribution may be seen
as a form of reverse-imperialism, especially given Libya’s investment in
Eni, an Italian company.
Actors’ Interests and Subsequent Interpretations
Some
critics prioritize the importance of perceptions by both internal and
external actors with regards to Libya’s geopolitical layout. Actors’
interests will often influence their attached interpretations of Libya
that may not consider e.g. historical or cultural factors. Internal
actors, however, are more likely to consider historical and cultural
factors, and it is for this reason that the National Transitional
Council (NTC), Islamist militants and Gaddafi himself placed symbolic
value on the small town of Sirte, Gaddafi’s birthplace. Until its fall
on October 20th, 2011, Sirte was regarded as a symbol of Gaddafi’s
strength (and that of his supporters). Indeed, the fact that Gaddafi was
found hiding in Sirte reveals the degree of personal importance the
deceased dictator attached to his town and tribe, despite the small size
of the Gaddafa, which, due to its size, was unlikely to afford him much
protection. Such internal significance is in stark contrast to the
NATO’s imposition of a no-fly zone and subsequent strategic bombing,
which has focused only on Libya’s resources as being of significant
value.
In addition, one must take into account other recent
events in the Middle East, for example the revolutionary movement in
Egypt and subsequent overthrow of President Hosni Mubarak. This
revolution was itself considered a response to the Tunisian uprising
against President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali. Both the revolutions in Egypt
and Tunisia can be considered as causing a domino effect that spilled
over into Libya. Given the fact that Libya borders both countries, with
Egypt on one side and Tunisia on the other, a domino or spillover effect
is quite likely. In addition, being ‘surrounded’ by countries in the
midst of revolution likely meant that Libya would not be protected from
potential spillover effects. Had, for example, only Tunisia engaged in
an uprising (but not Egypt in turn), a spillover effect may have been
limited by Tunisia’s small size relative to that of Libya’s. However,
one must remember that Libya’s aridness allows for only limited areas of
habitation, with population densities of approximately 50 persons per
square kilometer in habitable regions such as Tripolitania and
Cyrenaica. With such density, any spillover effect of governmental
hostility is likely to spread fast.
Conclusion
The
death of Gaddafi has removed one significant actor from the ongoing
chaos in Libya. However, conflict still exists between the GNC and
militant Islamic factions. What is most striking is the GNC’s focus on
ensuring elections, suggesting an attempt to shift toward democratic
rule. It would appear that the GNC is not taking into account Libya’s
resilient tribal history and the geographical factors that emphasize the
disparities between e.g. Cyrenaica and Tripolitania. It is possible
that the GNC is being influenced by external Western powers, whose
belief in democracy may in this case be driven by a desire for an open
society that will grant more open access to resources. In any case,
historical and geopolitical factors have shown the extent to which
Libyans have valued the tribal system and local leadership. Any attempt
to revamp the politics of Libya should thus include consideration of the
tribal system and historical animosity of Libya’s main regions.
Lingering belief in local authority and regional hostility may mean that
a split of Libya into politically autonomous territories should be
addressed first before democracy is celebrated.
geopoliticalmonitor.com
