yementimes
Libya-watchers should be encouraged by the initiation of the
country’s National Dialogue last month and an election date set for the
constitution-making body on February 20, both of which give much-needed
positive momentum to lift Libya out of the cycle of violence and
recrimination. The National Dialogue Preparatory Commission (NDPC) and
its seventy-five member advisory body are making critical decisions that
could set the dialogue up for success, or if managed badly, sow the
seeds of further unrest. While Libya’s context is unique, relevant
parallels with Yemen’s National Dialogue, which just concluded on
January 25, provide both valuable lessons and warning signals.
The
internationally-backed agreement that put an end to months of fighting
in 2011 in Yemen mandated an inclusive national dialogue to address the
underlying issues that led to the popular uprising—the lack of
functioning government, demands for independence and regional autonomy,
guaranteeing rights and freedoms, reducing the centralization of power,
eliminating corruption, and others. After months of preparation and
repeated delays, Yemen’s National Dialogue Conference (NDC) ultimately
agreed to 1400 articles and recommendations, some of which will now be
incorporated in a constitution to be drafted in the coming months. As
with Libya, creating a framework for the key actors in Yemen to stop
fighting and sit together peacefully in dialogue is in itself a notable
achievement. The real gains will rest on the ability of Yemen’s leaders
and institutions to actually implement the outcome, but in the meantime,
their experience can highlight some critical lessons as Libya treads
similar waters.
Key Lessons from Yemen’s National Dialogue:
Prioritize inclusiveness
For Libya, as for Yemen, instituting a process that is seen as
credible, legitimate, and representative—and getting the right people
around the table to agree to a non-violent, political process—is perhaps
more important than what the national charter will actually say.
Libya’s preparatory commission intends to conduct public outreach to
find out what issues are most important to address among citizens and to
utilize the seventy-five member advisory group in these consultations.
But security and economic concerns add pressure to move quickly and to
keep the process in step with the constitution-drafting time-table.
Allowing sufficient time for substantive outreach—not just paying lip
service or conducting some superficial meetings—cannot be
overemphasized.
In Yemen, the initial plan was that the National
Dialogue members would conduct field visits to listen to the concerns
and gather input from citizens outside the capital, as well as
transmitting information about what was happening inside the dialogue to
a broader audience. However, this was never fully implemented, both for
security, cost, and time issues, and a significant opportunity was
lost. Few people outside urban areas had any real knowledge of what was
happening in the “Republic of the Movenpick” (dubbed as such for the
swank hotel where the dialogue was held), and it was primarily viewed as
an elite-dominated exercise that consumed the capital city for a year
and a half, but had very little relevance elsewhere. Libya’s advisory
group for the dialogue can serve as two-way ambassadors, but that
mandate should be clearly defined at the outset. A strategy should be
developed for public consultation and communication throughout the
dialogue process, and resources should be made available to facilitate
that work.
Ensure transparency and active communication
The perceived transparency of the process will be just as important
in determining success as the actual agreements reached upon conclusion.
The value of the dialogue will be felt not only through the buy-in of
those sitting around the table, but of the constituencies they
represent. Libya’s dialogue could create a unifying national identity
and vision for the future, but only if a broad number of people are
aware of what is underway and have opportunities to participate.
Engaging diverse constituencies will require creativity in Libya’s tense
security environment, but effective avenues could include: televising
dialogue sessions, social media, radio programming, youth-led outreach,
town-hall meetings, street theatre, etc. This will be particularly
important in Libya’s fragmented political environment.
Yemen’s
National Dialogue Conference set up an active website, twitter feed, and
media outreach strategy. Their leadership gave frequent interviews and
comments to the press, which helped the Yemeni public and the
international community keep up-to-date in a fluid and highly
politicized environment. While valuable, this type of communication only
goes so far in a country with extremely low internet usage rates. Yemen
needed more active outreach outside Sana’a into various cities and
towns around the country by the dialogue members, political parties, and
other movements represented. Several NGOs convened town-hall meetings
and outreach tents, but survey research demonstrated that even with
these efforts, few people had any idea what was actually being
discussed.
Define a clear decision-making process
In Yemen, a legal framework that set the parameters
for the dialogue and empowered the dialogue’s preparatory committee to
take decisions contributed significantly to its success. With UN
assistance, the preparatory committee labored over draftingelaborate
rules and procedures (92 pages in total), which delineated how decisions
would be made. The committee had to reach consensus on each and every
point, and while this was a painful process at the time, it was effort
well-spent and set up a clear process to overcome inevitable impasses.
Reflecting
on her experience, Cathy Shin, former advisor to UN Envoy to Yemen
Jamal Benomar, noted, “While it took time for the preparatory committee
to come together, it was guided by its very specific mandate to come out
with precise outputs (the size of the delegation, drafting procedure
rules, role of international community, and media budget). Each decision
was made in a series of discussions based on options, and they did not
come to a final decision until consensus was reached. This negotiation
was not an easy process, but a genuine one.”
Set a timetable, but with flexibility
There is a tenuous balance between the urgency of moving forward
versus time needed for consensus. Yemen faced this predicament, and
Libya’s precarious security situation necessitates quick action. Yet
shortchanging this initial phase would mean rushing to meet artificial
deadlines, undercutting the opportunity for consensus-building and
undermining the very objective of the exercise. Libya’s preparatory
committee has outlined a three-month timeframe to complete the first
phase of the dialogue, which does not seem realistic given what they
need to achieve.
The NDPC should anticipate that the process of
selecting the 200-250 members will take longer than initially proposed.
In Yemen, the preparatory committee formulated an elaborate allocation
of delegates from each of the primary political parties and other formal
political movements (such as the Houthis in the north and the Herak in
the south), representatives of independent youth, women, and civil
society—but making those final decisions took months longer than
anticipated. Even if expedited slightly, the time spent helped develop
consensus within the preparatory committee. Despite the complex
preparations, Yemeni President Abdu Rabu Mansour Hadi ultimately had to
weigh in on the final selection; since he has enjoys a high level of
credibility, his decisions were accepted. Without such a figure in
Libya, clearly defining a transparent selection process and ensuring
acceptance of its members, could be the difference between success and
failure.
This inherent tension will be ever-present in Libya’s
dialogue, but some flexibility must be allowed in the timetable to
ensure that sufficient confidence-building measures are incorporated.
Manal Omar, Associate Vice President for Middle East and Africa at the
US Institute for Peace, noted that “Libya’s decision-making thus far has
been dominated by the political necessity of moving quickly, but this
has undercut the GNC and other institutions because the mandate or
authority (like that of the GNC president) was not clearly defined at
the outset, consensus was not reached, and ultimately they had to return
to the drawing board.” Rather than setting unreasonable timelines that
will necessitate an extension later, Libyans should anticipate and
incorporate into their planning the additional time needed for
consensus-building and inclusive consultation that will be necessary to
reach decisions that will be accepted by key elites, security forces,
and the population—a kind of temporal pressure valve.
The first
phase in Libya’s dialogue hopes to formally commit the major players to
the fundamental idea of a unified, peaceful future for the
country—particularly those responsible for destabilizing the political
and security environment—including militia forces, separatist groups,
and other potential spoilers. As such, the preparatory phase must ensure
that the effort has the broadest possible buy-in among various
stakeholders throughout the country. In an environment where most
Libyans lack trust in the government, the prime minister, and the
General National Congress (GNC), this process can serve as a unifying
backbone to facilitate necessary compromise and foster some momentum.
If Libya’s powerbrokers and stakeholders can muster the requisite
political will and leadership, the National Dialogue could lead the
country in the right direction toward a more peaceful, stable, and
democratic future.
Danya Greenfield is the acting director of
the Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East at the Atlantic Council and
the co-chair of the Yemen Policy Initiative, a joint effort of the
Atlantic Council and the Project on Middle East Democracy.
Republished with permission from the Atlantic Council.
