ourworld.unu.edu
In recent years, the critical need to build effective global-regional partnerships for peace has been re-emphasized in the context of the developments surrounding the responsibility to protect (R2P) principle. While the United Nations (UN) has devoted significant attention to the conceptual and operational development of this emerging norm, it has repeatedly praised regional organizations for their potential to contribute to an efficient and consistent implementation of the R2P.
In practice, however, the record of cooperation between the UN and regional organizations has not met the expectations formulated in R2P discourse.
In Libya in 2011, for instance, the UN and the African Union (AU) failed to join forces to seek an acceptable solution to the crisis. Instead, the two organizations independently adopted conflict resolution strategies that reflected their profoundly different perceptions of the situation and divergent stances towards the parties involved in the conflict. The lack of coordination of their efforts was detrimental to the conduct of their conflict settlement actions.
As the UN-mandated and NATO-led “no-fly zone” rapidly imposed itself as the dominant international response, the AU high-level ad hoc committee (AU committee) on Libya became sidelined. The AU expressed, on several occasions, its indignation about the lack of proper consideration given to African efforts to manage the Libyan crisis, in spite of the recognition of the AU high-level ad hoc committee in UN Security Council resolution 1973 and the international partners’ promises of support.
A relevant illustration of the impediments to the smooth conduct of the AU mediation mission is the rejection, by the Security Council’s sanctions committee, of its request to fly to Libya in order to engage in negotiations with the Libyan parties. This considerably impeded the AU committee’s early attempts at mediation.
The absence of early consultation on the situation in Libya between the UN and the AU carries its share of responsibility for the failure to adopt a consensual crisis settlement approach. It is quite telling that the first meeting on Libya between the UN Security Council and the AU high-level ad hoc committee only took place on 15 June — four months after the outbreak of the crisis — at the request of the AU Assembly. In the course of the meeting, the permanent representative of the Republic of Uganda to the UN, in his capacity as member of the AU committee, voiced concerns that unambiguously reflected the AU’s discontent with the lack of communication between the UN and the AU and, more fundamentally, the conflicting approaches of the two organizations.
If there is no doubt that the UN and the AU framed the situation and the kind of necessary action differently, it can be argued that a constructive exchange of views between the two organizations would have contributed to reconciling their respective approaches under a comprehensive and jointly implemented conflict settlement strategy. At the 15 June meeting, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation of the Islamic Republic of Mauritania, in his capacity as Chair of the AU committee, declared that a holistic solution was required to address the array of key priorities. He stressed the need to treat urgent issues in the short term, while contemplating the long-term perspective and build sustainable and lasting solutions.
To some extent, the division of roles in Libya was such that the UN responded to the urgent necessity to protect Libyan citizens by imposing a set of economic, diplomatic and military sanctions, and by voting for the establishment of a no-fly zone. The AU, on the other hand, engaged in tackling the longer term issue of bringing about a political and durable solution to the conflict by drawing on the support of the Libyan stakeholders.
If the approaches of the UN and the AU are, therefore, not conflicting as such, a tension arises from the uncoordinated implementation of their actions.This prompts for a substantial strengthening of ties between the UN and regional organizations based on well-established channels of communication fostering regular exchanges and early consultations when crises arise.
In Libya, early dialogue among key external stakeholders, including the UN, relevant regional organizations and neighbouring countries, and comprehensive consultations involving representatives of the Libyan people, would conceivably have led to a joint decision as to the mandate and the course of action to be collectively undertaken. Such a joint and coordinated approach would have been beneficial to the peace process, both from the short- and long-term perspectives.
In recent years, the critical need to build effective global-regional partnerships for peace has been re-emphasized in the context of the developments surrounding the responsibility to protect (R2P) principle. While the United Nations (UN) has devoted significant attention to the conceptual and operational development of this emerging norm, it has repeatedly praised regional organizations for their potential to contribute to an efficient and consistent implementation of the R2P.
In practice, however, the record of cooperation between the UN and regional organizations has not met the expectations formulated in R2P discourse.
In Libya in 2011, for instance, the UN and the African Union (AU) failed to join forces to seek an acceptable solution to the crisis. Instead, the two organizations independently adopted conflict resolution strategies that reflected their profoundly different perceptions of the situation and divergent stances towards the parties involved in the conflict. The lack of coordination of their efforts was detrimental to the conduct of their conflict settlement actions.
As the UN-mandated and NATO-led “no-fly zone” rapidly imposed itself as the dominant international response, the AU high-level ad hoc committee (AU committee) on Libya became sidelined. The AU expressed, on several occasions, its indignation about the lack of proper consideration given to African efforts to manage the Libyan crisis, in spite of the recognition of the AU high-level ad hoc committee in UN Security Council resolution 1973 and the international partners’ promises of support.
A relevant illustration of the impediments to the smooth conduct of the AU mediation mission is the rejection, by the Security Council’s sanctions committee, of its request to fly to Libya in order to engage in negotiations with the Libyan parties. This considerably impeded the AU committee’s early attempts at mediation.
The absence of early consultation on the situation in Libya between the UN and the AU carries its share of responsibility for the failure to adopt a consensual crisis settlement approach. It is quite telling that the first meeting on Libya between the UN Security Council and the AU high-level ad hoc committee only took place on 15 June — four months after the outbreak of the crisis — at the request of the AU Assembly. In the course of the meeting, the permanent representative of the Republic of Uganda to the UN, in his capacity as member of the AU committee, voiced concerns that unambiguously reflected the AU’s discontent with the lack of communication between the UN and the AU and, more fundamentally, the conflicting approaches of the two organizations.
If there is no doubt that the UN and the AU framed the situation and the kind of necessary action differently, it can be argued that a constructive exchange of views between the two organizations would have contributed to reconciling their respective approaches under a comprehensive and jointly implemented conflict settlement strategy. At the 15 June meeting, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation of the Islamic Republic of Mauritania, in his capacity as Chair of the AU committee, declared that a holistic solution was required to address the array of key priorities. He stressed the need to treat urgent issues in the short term, while contemplating the long-term perspective and build sustainable and lasting solutions.
To some extent, the division of roles in Libya was such that the UN responded to the urgent necessity to protect Libyan citizens by imposing a set of economic, diplomatic and military sanctions, and by voting for the establishment of a no-fly zone. The AU, on the other hand, engaged in tackling the longer term issue of bringing about a political and durable solution to the conflict by drawing on the support of the Libyan stakeholders.
If the approaches of the UN and the AU are, therefore, not conflicting as such, a tension arises from the uncoordinated implementation of their actions.This prompts for a substantial strengthening of ties between the UN and regional organizations based on well-established channels of communication fostering regular exchanges and early consultations when crises arise.
In Libya, early dialogue among key external stakeholders, including the UN, relevant regional organizations and neighbouring countries, and comprehensive consultations involving representatives of the Libyan people, would conceivably have led to a joint decision as to the mandate and the course of action to be collectively undertaken. Such a joint and coordinated approach would have been beneficial to the peace process, both from the short- and long-term perspectives.
When
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton made a brief self-congratulatory
trip to Tripoli, Libya, in October 2011 — with U.S. military assets
lurking offshore in case they needed to rescue her — she joked, in the
presence of then-Ambassador Gene Cretz and Assistant Secretary of State
Jeffrey Feltman, that they had not-so-long-ago been worried that the
ambassador might end up the target of a murderous Libyan assault.
"As Gene and Assistant Secretary Feltman and I were walking through here, they were talking about how the last time Jeff was here was when we were very worried that Gadhafi and [Libyan intelligence chief] Senussi were going to kill you," Clinton said in a speech to the staff at the U.S. Embassy.
"Yeah," said Cretz.
The State Department transcript notes there was "laughter" at this.
"I am very pleased to have this chance to thank each and every one of you, and to return as secretary of state to a free Libya," said Clinton. "And what an amazing experience."
Seven months before Clinton made this trip to Tripoli, President Obama announced in Brazil that he was ordering the U.S. military to intervene in Libya because "the writ of the international community must be enforced."
Within eight months of Clinton's trip, the Defense Department and CIA were producing repeated reports warning that Libya — particularly eastern Libya — was becoming a safe haven for terrorists, including al-Qaida-affiliated terrorists.
Thanks to a report released last week by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence we now know some of the substance of these DOD and CIA warnings.
They demonstrate how Obama's intervention in Libya's civil war backfired and how the inexplicable negligence of Hillary Clinton's State Department put Americans unnecessarily at risk in Benghazi.
On June 12, 2012, according to the intelligence committee's report, the Defense Intelligence Agency authored a report entitled: "Libya: Terrorists Now Targeting U.S. and Western Interests."
As characterized by the committee — chaired by Democratic Sen. Dianne Feinstein of California — this DIA report noted "growing ties between al-Qaida regional nodes and Libya-based terrorists."
The DIA said: "We expect more anti-U.S. terrorist attacks in eastern Libya [redacted], due to the terrorists greater presence there."
Six days later, according to the committee report, the Pentagon's Joint Staff daily intelligence report included a slide entitled: "Terrorism: Conditions Ripe for More Attacks, Terrorist Safe Haven in Libya."
It said: "[Redacted] support will increase Libyan terrorist capability in the permissive post-revolution security environment.
Attacks will also increase in number and lethality as terrorists connect with AQ associates in Libya. Areas of eastern Libya will likely become a safe haven by the end of 2012."
A CIA report issued on July 6, 2012 — "Libya: Al-Qaida Establishing Sanctuary" — was more declarative.
"Al-Qaida-affiliated groups and associates are exploiting the permissive security environment in Libya to enhance their capabilities and expand their operational reach," said this CIA report.
"This year," said the CIA report, "Muhammad Jamal's Egypt-based network, al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula, and al-Qaida in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb have conducted training, built communications networks, and facilitated extremist travel across North Africa from their safe haven in parts of eastern Libya."
Two months before the Sept. 11, 2012 terrorist attacks in Benghazi that killed four Americans, the CIA was already reporting that al-Qaida affiliated terrorists had made parts of eastern Libya "their safe haven."
Soon after that, a CIA officer told State Department officials that al-Qaida affiliated terrorists had training camps "within Benghazi."
On Aug. 15, 2012, according to the Senate committee report, the State Department's principal officer in Benghazi called together an "Emergency Action Committee" to discuss "the deteriorating security situation in Benghazi."
The next day, Ambassador Chris Stevens sent a cable to State Department headquarters in Washington, D.C., summarizing the points made at this meeting.
Stevens' cable said a CIA officer had "briefed the EAC on the location of approximately ten Islamist militias and AQ training camps within Benghazi."
When Gen. Carter Ham, then commander of AFRICOM, saw this assessment of the situation in Libya, said the Senate report, he offered to extend the deployment of DOD's Site Security Team — a group "16 special operations personnel detailed to the Chief of Mission in Libya."
"After reading the August 16, 2012, EAC cable, General Ham called Ambassador Stevens and asked if the Embassy needed the SST from the U.S. military, but Stevens told Ham it did not," said the Senate report. "Shortly thereafter, Stevens traveled to Germany for a previously scheduled meeting with Ham at AFRICOM headquarters. Ham again offered to sustain the SST at the meeting, and Stevens again declined."
"State Department headquarters made the decision not to request an extension of the SST's mission in August 2012, approximately one month prior to the attacks, because State believed that many of the duties of the SST could be accomplished by local security forces, DS agents, or other State Department capabilities," said the report.
After the Sept. 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, Congress authorized the president to use military force to deny al-Qaida a sanctuary in Afghanistan. In March 2011, President Obama unilaterally ordered the U.S. military to intervene in Libya's civil war — and helped turn that country into a sanctuary for al-Qaida-affiliated terrorists. - See more at: http://cnsnews.com/commentary/terence-p-jeffrey/senate-report-cia-libya-al-qaida-establishing-sanctuary#sthash.h7TZp4ac.d
"As Gene and Assistant Secretary Feltman and I were walking through here, they were talking about how the last time Jeff was here was when we were very worried that Gadhafi and [Libyan intelligence chief] Senussi were going to kill you," Clinton said in a speech to the staff at the U.S. Embassy.
"Yeah," said Cretz.
The State Department transcript notes there was "laughter" at this.
"I am very pleased to have this chance to thank each and every one of you, and to return as secretary of state to a free Libya," said Clinton. "And what an amazing experience."
Seven months before Clinton made this trip to Tripoli, President Obama announced in Brazil that he was ordering the U.S. military to intervene in Libya because "the writ of the international community must be enforced."
Within eight months of Clinton's trip, the Defense Department and CIA were producing repeated reports warning that Libya — particularly eastern Libya — was becoming a safe haven for terrorists, including al-Qaida-affiliated terrorists.
Thanks to a report released last week by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence we now know some of the substance of these DOD and CIA warnings.
They demonstrate how Obama's intervention in Libya's civil war backfired and how the inexplicable negligence of Hillary Clinton's State Department put Americans unnecessarily at risk in Benghazi.
On June 12, 2012, according to the intelligence committee's report, the Defense Intelligence Agency authored a report entitled: "Libya: Terrorists Now Targeting U.S. and Western Interests."
As characterized by the committee — chaired by Democratic Sen. Dianne Feinstein of California — this DIA report noted "growing ties between al-Qaida regional nodes and Libya-based terrorists."
The DIA said: "We expect more anti-U.S. terrorist attacks in eastern Libya [redacted], due to the terrorists greater presence there."
Six days later, according to the committee report, the Pentagon's Joint Staff daily intelligence report included a slide entitled: "Terrorism: Conditions Ripe for More Attacks, Terrorist Safe Haven in Libya."
It said: "[Redacted] support will increase Libyan terrorist capability in the permissive post-revolution security environment.
Attacks will also increase in number and lethality as terrorists connect with AQ associates in Libya. Areas of eastern Libya will likely become a safe haven by the end of 2012."
A CIA report issued on July 6, 2012 — "Libya: Al-Qaida Establishing Sanctuary" — was more declarative.
"Al-Qaida-affiliated groups and associates are exploiting the permissive security environment in Libya to enhance their capabilities and expand their operational reach," said this CIA report.
"This year," said the CIA report, "Muhammad Jamal's Egypt-based network, al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula, and al-Qaida in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb have conducted training, built communications networks, and facilitated extremist travel across North Africa from their safe haven in parts of eastern Libya."
Two months before the Sept. 11, 2012 terrorist attacks in Benghazi that killed four Americans, the CIA was already reporting that al-Qaida affiliated terrorists had made parts of eastern Libya "their safe haven."
Soon after that, a CIA officer told State Department officials that al-Qaida affiliated terrorists had training camps "within Benghazi."
On Aug. 15, 2012, according to the Senate committee report, the State Department's principal officer in Benghazi called together an "Emergency Action Committee" to discuss "the deteriorating security situation in Benghazi."
The next day, Ambassador Chris Stevens sent a cable to State Department headquarters in Washington, D.C., summarizing the points made at this meeting.
Stevens' cable said a CIA officer had "briefed the EAC on the location of approximately ten Islamist militias and AQ training camps within Benghazi."
When Gen. Carter Ham, then commander of AFRICOM, saw this assessment of the situation in Libya, said the Senate report, he offered to extend the deployment of DOD's Site Security Team — a group "16 special operations personnel detailed to the Chief of Mission in Libya."
"After reading the August 16, 2012, EAC cable, General Ham called Ambassador Stevens and asked if the Embassy needed the SST from the U.S. military, but Stevens told Ham it did not," said the Senate report. "Shortly thereafter, Stevens traveled to Germany for a previously scheduled meeting with Ham at AFRICOM headquarters. Ham again offered to sustain the SST at the meeting, and Stevens again declined."
"State Department headquarters made the decision not to request an extension of the SST's mission in August 2012, approximately one month prior to the attacks, because State believed that many of the duties of the SST could be accomplished by local security forces, DS agents, or other State Department capabilities," said the report.
After the Sept. 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, Congress authorized the president to use military force to deny al-Qaida a sanctuary in Afghanistan. In March 2011, President Obama unilaterally ordered the U.S. military to intervene in Libya's civil war — and helped turn that country into a sanctuary for al-Qaida-affiliated terrorists. - See more at: http://cnsnews.com/commentary/terence-p-jeffrey/senate-report-cia-libya-al-qaida-establishing-sanctuary#sthash.h7TZp4ac.d
When
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton made a brief self-congratulatory
trip to Tripoli, Libya, in October 2011 — with U.S. military assets
lurking offshore in case they needed to rescue her — she joked, in the
presence of then-Ambassador Gene Cretz and Assistant Secretary of State
Jeffrey Feltman, that they had not-so-long-ago been worried that the
ambassador might end up the target of a murderous Libyan assault.
"As Gene and Assistant Secretary Feltman and I were walking through here, they were talking about how the last time Jeff was here was when we were very worried that Gadhafi and [Libyan intelligence chief] Senussi were going to kill you," Clinton said in a speech to the staff at the U.S. Embassy.
"Yeah," said Cretz.
The State Department transcript notes there was "laughter" at this.
"I am very pleased to have this chance to thank each and every one of you, and to return as secretary of state to a free Libya," said Clinton. "And what an amazing experience."
Seven months before Clinton made this trip to Tripoli, President Obama announced in Brazil that he was ordering the U.S. military to intervene in Libya because "the writ of the international community must be enforced."
Within eight months of Clinton's trip, the Defense Department and CIA were producing repeated reports warning that Libya — particularly eastern Libya — was becoming a safe haven for terrorists, including al-Qaida-affiliated terrorists.
Thanks to a report released last week by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence we now know some of the substance of these DOD and CIA warnings.
They demonstrate how Obama's intervention in Libya's civil war backfired and how the inexplicable negligence of Hillary Clinton's State Department put Americans unnecessarily at risk in Benghazi.
On June 12, 2012, according to the intelligence committee's report, the Defense Intelligence Agency authored a report entitled: "Libya: Terrorists Now Targeting U.S. and Western Interests."
As characterized by the committee — chaired by Democratic Sen. Dianne Feinstein of California — this DIA report noted "growing ties between al-Qaida regional nodes and Libya-based terrorists."
The DIA said: "We expect more anti-U.S. terrorist attacks in eastern Libya [redacted], due to the terrorists greater presence there."
Six days later, according to the committee report, the Pentagon's Joint Staff daily intelligence report included a slide entitled: "Terrorism: Conditions Ripe for More Attacks, Terrorist Safe Haven in Libya."
It said: "[Redacted] support will increase Libyan terrorist capability in the permissive post-revolution security environment.
Attacks will also increase in number and lethality as terrorists connect with AQ associates in Libya. Areas of eastern Libya will likely become a safe haven by the end of 2012."
A CIA report issued on July 6, 2012 — "Libya: Al-Qaida Establishing Sanctuary" — was more declarative.
"Al-Qaida-affiliated groups and associates are exploiting the permissive security environment in Libya to enhance their capabilities and expand their operational reach," said this CIA report.
"This year," said the CIA report, "Muhammad Jamal's Egypt-based network, al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula, and al-Qaida in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb have conducted training, built communications networks, and facilitated extremist travel across North Africa from their safe haven in parts of eastern Libya."
Two months before the Sept. 11, 2012 terrorist attacks in Benghazi that killed four Americans, the CIA was already reporting that al-Qaida affiliated terrorists had made parts of eastern Libya "their safe haven."
Soon after that, a CIA officer told State Department officials that al-Qaida affiliated terrorists had training camps "within Benghazi."
On Aug. 15, 2012, according to the Senate committee report, the State Department's principal officer in Benghazi called together an "Emergency Action Committee" to discuss "the deteriorating security situation in Benghazi."
The next day, Ambassador Chris Stevens sent a cable to State Department headquarters in Washington, D.C., summarizing the points made at this meeting.
Stevens' cable said a CIA officer had "briefed the EAC on the location of approximately ten Islamist militias and AQ training camps within Benghazi."
When Gen. Carter Ham, then commander of AFRICOM, saw this assessment of the situation in Libya, said the Senate report, he offered to extend the deployment of DOD's Site Security Team — a group "16 special operations personnel detailed to the Chief of Mission in Libya."
"After reading the August 16, 2012, EAC cable, General Ham called Ambassador Stevens and asked if the Embassy needed the SST from the U.S. military, but Stevens told Ham it did not," said the Senate report. "Shortly thereafter, Stevens traveled to Germany for a previously scheduled meeting with Ham at AFRICOM headquarters. Ham again offered to sustain the SST at the meeting, and Stevens again declined."
"State Department headquarters made the decision not to request an extension of the SST's mission in August 2012, approximately one month prior to the attacks, because State believed that many of the duties of the SST could be accomplished by local security forces, DS agents, or other State Department capabilities," said the report.
After the Sept. 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, Congress authorized the president to use military force to deny al-Qaida a sanctuary in Afghanistan. In March 2011, President Obama unilaterally ordered the U.S. military to intervene in Libya's civil war — and helped turn that country into a sanctuary for al-Qaida-affiliated terrorists. - See more at: http://cnsnews.com/commentary/terence-p-jeffrey/senate-report-cia-libya-al-qaida-establishing-sanctuary#sthash.h7TZp4ac.dpuf
"As Gene and Assistant Secretary Feltman and I were walking through here, they were talking about how the last time Jeff was here was when we were very worried that Gadhafi and [Libyan intelligence chief] Senussi were going to kill you," Clinton said in a speech to the staff at the U.S. Embassy.
"Yeah," said Cretz.
The State Department transcript notes there was "laughter" at this.
"I am very pleased to have this chance to thank each and every one of you, and to return as secretary of state to a free Libya," said Clinton. "And what an amazing experience."
Seven months before Clinton made this trip to Tripoli, President Obama announced in Brazil that he was ordering the U.S. military to intervene in Libya because "the writ of the international community must be enforced."
Within eight months of Clinton's trip, the Defense Department and CIA were producing repeated reports warning that Libya — particularly eastern Libya — was becoming a safe haven for terrorists, including al-Qaida-affiliated terrorists.
Thanks to a report released last week by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence we now know some of the substance of these DOD and CIA warnings.
They demonstrate how Obama's intervention in Libya's civil war backfired and how the inexplicable negligence of Hillary Clinton's State Department put Americans unnecessarily at risk in Benghazi.
On June 12, 2012, according to the intelligence committee's report, the Defense Intelligence Agency authored a report entitled: "Libya: Terrorists Now Targeting U.S. and Western Interests."
As characterized by the committee — chaired by Democratic Sen. Dianne Feinstein of California — this DIA report noted "growing ties between al-Qaida regional nodes and Libya-based terrorists."
The DIA said: "We expect more anti-U.S. terrorist attacks in eastern Libya [redacted], due to the terrorists greater presence there."
Six days later, according to the committee report, the Pentagon's Joint Staff daily intelligence report included a slide entitled: "Terrorism: Conditions Ripe for More Attacks, Terrorist Safe Haven in Libya."
It said: "[Redacted] support will increase Libyan terrorist capability in the permissive post-revolution security environment.
Attacks will also increase in number and lethality as terrorists connect with AQ associates in Libya. Areas of eastern Libya will likely become a safe haven by the end of 2012."
A CIA report issued on July 6, 2012 — "Libya: Al-Qaida Establishing Sanctuary" — was more declarative.
"Al-Qaida-affiliated groups and associates are exploiting the permissive security environment in Libya to enhance their capabilities and expand their operational reach," said this CIA report.
"This year," said the CIA report, "Muhammad Jamal's Egypt-based network, al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula, and al-Qaida in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb have conducted training, built communications networks, and facilitated extremist travel across North Africa from their safe haven in parts of eastern Libya."
Two months before the Sept. 11, 2012 terrorist attacks in Benghazi that killed four Americans, the CIA was already reporting that al-Qaida affiliated terrorists had made parts of eastern Libya "their safe haven."
Soon after that, a CIA officer told State Department officials that al-Qaida affiliated terrorists had training camps "within Benghazi."
On Aug. 15, 2012, according to the Senate committee report, the State Department's principal officer in Benghazi called together an "Emergency Action Committee" to discuss "the deteriorating security situation in Benghazi."
The next day, Ambassador Chris Stevens sent a cable to State Department headquarters in Washington, D.C., summarizing the points made at this meeting.
Stevens' cable said a CIA officer had "briefed the EAC on the location of approximately ten Islamist militias and AQ training camps within Benghazi."
When Gen. Carter Ham, then commander of AFRICOM, saw this assessment of the situation in Libya, said the Senate report, he offered to extend the deployment of DOD's Site Security Team — a group "16 special operations personnel detailed to the Chief of Mission in Libya."
"After reading the August 16, 2012, EAC cable, General Ham called Ambassador Stevens and asked if the Embassy needed the SST from the U.S. military, but Stevens told Ham it did not," said the Senate report. "Shortly thereafter, Stevens traveled to Germany for a previously scheduled meeting with Ham at AFRICOM headquarters. Ham again offered to sustain the SST at the meeting, and Stevens again declined."
"State Department headquarters made the decision not to request an extension of the SST's mission in August 2012, approximately one month prior to the attacks, because State believed that many of the duties of the SST could be accomplished by local security forces, DS agents, or other State Department capabilities," said the report.
After the Sept. 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, Congress authorized the president to use military force to deny al-Qaida a sanctuary in Afghanistan. In March 2011, President Obama unilaterally ordered the U.S. military to intervene in Libya's civil war — and helped turn that country into a sanctuary for al-Qaida-affiliated terrorists. - See more at: http://cnsnews.com/commentary/terence-p-jeffrey/senate-report-cia-libya-al-qaida-establishing-sanctuary#sthash.h7TZp4ac.dpuf
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